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Pavel Ol’khOv
The Old New Bakhtin
Essays from Mikhail Bakhtin’s early years in volume one of his collected 
works are discussed and contextualized.
The first volume of the Bakhtin Collected Works1 contains his early philo-
sophical studies from the Nevel’-Vitebsk period (1919–1923) and the major 
methodological project undertaken after his move to Leningrad, which 
critically analyzed the principles of “the young Russian poetics” (eventually 
known as the formal method in literary studies) and devised an alternative 
approach to literature and to “the aesthetics of the written word” (1924). The 
Appendix contains courses of lectures given by Bakhtin to a narrow circle 
of friends in 1924 and 1925, and recorded by the remarkable theoretical 
philologist Lev Pumpianskii. The topics covered in those courses—Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, the new philosophical aesthetics of “author” and 
“hero,” the philosophy of religion (not “religious philosophy”)—tell us a lot. 
All these works had been published earlier, but the Collected Works has made 
them look almost new again, and in essence they read as brand new texts. 
What we have here is a supposedly famous but actually not so well-known 
and even less well-understood Russian thinker and scholar, with none of 
that ersatz-Soviet mimicry and masking—someone so like his many famous 
contemporaries in philosophy and so unlike any of them. What we have here 
is an old new Bakhtin.
Now no longer part of their own time, these texts have been published 
with exhaustive archival backup and come complete with thorough and 
highly diverse commentaries. But, although the commentaries occupy over 
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two-thirds of the book, it would be difficult to call them excessive. They 
reveal, in a varying degree of detail, a context derived from the philosophy 
and scholarship of the time that is little known today, the “dialogic backdrop” 
(a borrowing from the Bakhtinian lexicon) against which for all but the first 
time it now becomes possible to see and assess what it was in Bakhtin that 
made him, as Averintsev said, “one of a kind.”2
The work done here may without exaggeration be called selflessly, hero-
ically meticulous. Prior decipherings of badly preserved early manuscripts 
have been rechecked and refined; previously unread passages have been 
closely read and published for the first time; and cuts made in Soviet times 
have been restored. One can only imagine what an effort this must have been 
for Bocharov’s team and Bocharov himself. But those efforts were, in my 
view, completely justified: this first volume, while not “the biggest and best” 
is at least a key contribution to the project. Among its revelations are the 
scholarly-cum-philosophical and the religious-cum-philosophical underpin-
nings of Bakhtin’s thought (up to and including the “philosophy of language” 
and the “grotesque body”). The word “dialogue” is still absent, but the agenda 
of “dialogism” is outlined in the framework provided by the socio-ontological 
reversal and transformation of the mainstream Western European tradition 
of “the first philosophy,” from Plato and Aristotle to Hermann Cohen and 
Edmund Husserl.
This new “revolution in modes of thought” that took place in the West 
(primarily in Germany) between 1919 and 1924 could never come normally 
and fully into its own in Russian philosophy, and this has made something 
of a mark on the commentary to a programmatic fragment by Bakhtin that 
Bocharov long ago aptly titled “Toward a Philosophy of the Act” [K filosofii 
postupka]. The fragmentary nature of, and the outcomes for, the majority of 
the texts that have found their way into this first volume prove emphatically 
that what actually did happen in Russian philosophy was something that, in 
fact, could never be.
Anyone rereading Bakhtin’s early writings and spoken words cannot fail 
to be struck by the almost incredible (by today’s standards) maturity of this 
young thinker—the maturity and integrality of his thought, which tackles 
pan-European problems yet is recognizably Russian not only in its language 
but also at its very core. The linear historical flow-chart of Bakhtin’s osten-
sible emergence and ascent that underlies currently prevalent notions of his 
“creative phases” and was uncritically borrowed from the nineteenth-century 
setting is open to question, as is the idealized, “literocentric,” late-Soviet no-
tion of what was happening during the twenties, which is also prevalent in 
Western “Russistics.”
This first volume opens with the brief article and manifesto “Art and 
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Answerability” [Iskusstvo i otvetstvennost’] (1919), which reveals the key se-
mantic syntheses of Bakhtin’s new—postidealist and postsymbolist—thinking, 
to which neither pre-Soviet religious-idealistic nor scientific-materialist Soviet 
criteria apply. It begins by speaking of a “whole,” and all the works in this 
volume do go on to demonstrate the intercalation and interpenetration of “the 
three domains of human culture—science, art and life” (I, 5).*
Rereading these texts—long-familiar but here rendered new again, so 
clear but lacking the more familiar and allegedly definitive clarity—I could 
not shake off a keen sense of, on the one hand, Bakhtin’s creative continuity 
and integrality of expression and, on the other, the lack of moral precedent 
for his dicta. “Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving oneself” said Ludwig 
Wittgenstein,3 but from the very beginning, Bakhtin seems to have been able 
to accomplish that very difficult thing. His early philosophical manuscripts 
contain none of the philosopher’s normal theoretical unilateralism and are 
also lacking the usual “existential” fuss and bother—no despair, no hyster-
ics, no pretensions, no demolition of prior theories and thought systems, no 
“deconstruction” of traditions with which the young thinker actually did 
take issue. Evident in every remotely expanded statement are a grand man-
ner [bol’shoi stil’] and an emphasis on the common sense that was so little 
valued by Bakhtin’s Russian and Western contemporaries, whose inclinations 
ran instead to “reverie and a drunken exuberance.”
Bakhtin’s speech-thinking [rechevoe myshlenie] is difficult to access pre-
cisely by virtue of the primordial moral veracity of his thought. That authen-
ticity is founded in a determination to recognize thought as effectual only if it 
refuses to accept the ultimate guarantees and gifts: “I have to answer with my 
own life for what I have experienced and understood in art, so that everything 
I have experienced and understood would not remain ineffectual in my life” 
(I, 5 [a&a, p. 1]). This means that neither art nor science nor life suffices to 
itself or exists simply in its own right, with a value all its own, although once 
these spheres of human culture are abstracted from personal responsibility,** 
the impression arises (accompanied by an ostensible guarantee) that they are 
indeed self-sufficient (autonomous). In fact, though, nothing is autonomous 
and there are no guarantees. Only the individual person [lichnost_’] can as-
sume the responsibility for the “inner link” among the intrinsically fragmented 
“elements of the personality”—a responsibility that is not rhetorically public, 
not theoretical, not aestheticized, and to that extent not “official.” “Nor will it 
   *art and answerability, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim 
Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), p. 1 (below, a&a).—Trans.
**Also renderable as “accountability” or “answerability”—Trans.
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do to invoke ‘inspiration’ in order to justify want of answerability. Inspiration 
that ignores life and is itself ignored by life is not inspiration but a state of 
possession” (I, 5–6 [a&a, p. 2]).
Common sense and common words, the good, common sense that avoids 
the extremes of various cognitive strategies and styles, from empiricism to 
naturalism; the good, common words that all reasoning must have and that 
are needed only so that we can clarify the tradition of their past usage and 
thus include them into a new, contemporary conversation—that, if I have it 
right, is the hermeneutic wellspring of Bakhtinian thought in its historical-
philosophical dimension.
The expansional, informal understanding of “good sense,” the link between 
common sense and common words, in the tradition of sound Western thought, 
is founded particularly in the eighteenth-century Scottish School of Common 
Sense.4 Unlike the reputation of Thomas Reid (a Scottish thinker who in his 
day even eclipsed the authority of David Hume, his contemporary), that of 
Russian philosophers of a comparable caliber was far more modest. These 
would be Nikolai Strakhov and, in some measure, Vasilii Rozanov (who 
acknowledged himself as a student of Strakhov’s), among others, and Lev 
Tolstoy whose oeuvre (all the way from the early stories to War and Peace 
and anna Karenina) was rarely valued expressly for its “good sense.”5
How are life and thought possible in an age that has abolished all the tra-
ditional idealizations, the theoretical and generally “bookish” meanings of 
what we know as culture, in an age that certainly did not begin (if that word 
“begin” has any place here at all) today? What are the options for a person 
who found himself in a rift between centuries and millennia and, in particular, 
at a philosophical crossroads?
A philosopher, a thinker should, Bakhtin thought, begin again and afresh, 
by rejecting naivetes of thought per se—this being thinking for thinking’s 
sake, or for “art’s” sake, or for “science’s” sake, or even for “just life’s” sake. 
Bakhtin begins with something that in his time had almost run its course in 
“creativity,” namely, with a newly achieved intellectual “sobriety,” with the 
establishment of mutual contact between “the one and only I,” the thinking 
entity, and the others outside me, those who generally allow the thinker to, 
one might say, “eclipse” himself.
The sobriety and soundness of “utterances,” of logoi, lies in the ability to 
speak without pontification of everything that is perturbing or interesting, 
without pretending that my addressee is “the public,” “mankind,” or “the 
omnitude” [vsemstvo]; that what I say has never been said, thought, or wrought 
before; that therefore what I have said or done (“a global first”) frees me from 
responsibility for everything else (including the consequences of what has 
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been said) and guarantees me, to borrow Bakhtin’s own expression “an alibi 
in the event of being.” The rejection of any spiritual guarantees whatsoever, 
of the reckless wager on a “new world” (that many in the past century did 
“buy into”) also permits one, paradoxical as this may sound, to start think-
ing responsively and responsibly, while confidentially drawing those (and 
no other) contemporaries and conversation partners of mine into an actual 
conversation.
This is a radical, primordial rejection of the concepts of the “I” or (the 
same thing in reverse) the “One and Only” (in Bakhtinian terms, of “mo-
nologism”), a genuine “moving away from the mirror” (the mirror that is 
inevitable in aestheticism or “theoreticism”). Unfortunately, it seems to me 
that insufficient allowance has been made for this by Liudmila Gogotishvili 
in her commentary on “Toward a Philosophy of the Act.” Gogotishvili relies 
in her use of language on the “Ich” of German Idealism and Romanticism 
(seemingly more serviceable on Russian terrain) that follows a model dating 
to 1800 and even in part to 1910, that is, on a model of thought with whose 
critique here, in this programmatic text, Bakhtin’s “dialogism”—not in letter 
but in spirit—begins (as, for that matter, do all the basic varieties of Western 
“dialogic thought” of the 1920s and beyond).
Writing about all this is no simple matter. The Bakhtinian word is volumi-
nously effectual, “performative”; it would be wholly inaccurate to reduce it 
to a standard of rigor or to an imperative. Bakhtin’s philosophical word is a 
free verbal actuality, in which the eternal positive senses of human existence 
are freely selected and construed in a patent unity. The early Bakhtin is not 
even slightly less difficult than the studies in literary theory and culturosophy 
that followed, from the mid-1920s to the mid-1970s. But the young Bakhtin 
is more concretely historical, more authentic; he is directly (and therefore 
more comprehensibly) correlated with the scientific and ethical problems of 
his time, with his “ideological milieu of consciousness” that was already dis-
solving away in the 1930s and then, “an epoch on”—to borrow Bocharov’s 
expression—(beginning in the 1960s, that is), would turn out to be very 
nearly “stolen air” [Mandel’shtam’s metaphor for a work written “without 
permission”—Trans.].
The commentaries to the texts are, as I have mentioned, very diverse. The 
writers, each in his or her own way, combine classical, historical-philosophical 
commentary with elements of their own research. And in this respect, the com-
mentaries by Liudmila Gogotishvili and Nikolai Nikolaev are diametrically 
opposed. Nikolaev, as a rule, maintains a critical distance from the texts he is 
discussing. He works, as it were, in “the third person,” and his commentaries 
are distinguished by the bibliographical and historiographical punctiliousness 
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that is so seldom encountered in scholarly editions today. Gogotishvili’s com-
mentaries, by contrast, are more “metatheoretical,” representing a “first-per-
son” attempt to “assimilate” another’s speech. She constructs a self-sufficient 
metatheoretical text, identifying 16 semantic “blocs” in “Toward a Philosophy 
of the Act” and employing them in a valiant effort to close the gap between 
Bakhtin and the Russian religious-idealistic tradition.
Vitalii Makhlin’s commentaries stand somewhat apart, as they manifest a 
systematic interest in Bakhtin’s program of scientific philosophy. What they 
offer is, as it were, a set of monographic novellas on the history of Bakhtinian 
concepts and of the entire conceptual array [poniatiinyi riad] whose absence 
makes it difficult to achieve a well-considered attitude toward the tradition of 
Bakhtin’s world of concepts or to grasp its inherent semantic novelty.
Taken all together, so thorough is the historical-philosophical and histor-
ical-scholarly apparatus of this first volume that an attentive reading of the 
commentaries will not only bring to light the systematized net results of, and 
future prospects for, Bakhtin studies worldwide with respect to Bakhtin’s initial 
theoretical frames of reference but will also offer new answers to questions 
regarding the legitimacy of Bakhtin’s body of work.
I think that Bakhtin, being a thinker who did not say all he wished to for 
the historical record and who lies preserved in the archives of various ep-
ochs, is a treat awaiting contemporary Russian philosophers and students of 
the humanities. This first scholarly edition of Bakhtin’s early philosophical 
works comes to the reader at a time when the prior “paradigms” are failing, 
in both spiritual and ideological terms, and nostalgia for a now-lost “sublime 
experience” is rampant. Standing amid the wreckage of their hard-won au-
tonomy, the humanities are tacitly but none the less persistently. . . waiting 
for Bakhtin.
Belgorod
Notes
1. M.M. Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii, 7 vols., ed. S.G. Bocharov and N.I. Nikolaev, 
commentaries by S.S. Averintsev, L.A. Gogotishvili, V.V. Liapunov, V.L. Makhlin, 
and N.I. Nikolaev (Moscow: Russkie slovari/Iazyki slavianskoi kul’tury, 1997–2012); 
vol. I: filosofskaia estetika 1920-kh godov. The volume and page numbers given in 
parentheses in the text refer to this edition.
2. S. Averintsev, “Lichnost’ i talant uchenogo (1976),” in M.M. Bakhtin: Krit-
icheskaia antologiia, ed. V.L. Makhlin (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Rossiiskoi politicheskoi 
entsiklopedii, ROSSPEN, 2010), p. 93.
3. L. Vitgenshtein, “Kul’tura i tsennost’,” in Vitgenshtein, filosofskie raboty, pt. 1, 
compilation, introduction, and notes by M.S. Kozlova, trans. from German by M.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
faLL  2014 15
Kozlova and Iu.A. Aseev (Moscow: Gnozis, 1994), p. 443. [Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Culture and Value, translated by Peter Winch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), p. 34e.—Trans.]
4. See, for example, T. Rid [Thomas Reid], issledovanie chelovecheskogo uma na 
printsipakh zdravogo smysla (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000). [Original title: inquiry 
into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense—Trans.]
5. In this connection, see P.A. Ol’khov, “Zravyi smysl i istoriia (zametki k polemi-
cheskoi epitafii N.N. Strakhova ‘Vzdokh nad grobe Karamzina’),” Voprosy filosofii, 
2009, no. 5. [http://vphil.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19, 
accessed May 2014—Trans.]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
